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UCC Sections 5-102 and 5-103: A Solution to the
Stand-by Letter of Credit Identity Crisis
INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, United States banks have increasingly welcomed and encouranged a new market for their credit services-the stand-by letter of credit.' Five billion dollars in standby letters of credit issued by United States banks and their foreign
branches were outstanding in December, 1973.2 By December,
1978, the figure had jumped to twenty-five billion dollars.3 Standby letters of credit have enabled the banking industry to expand
its role in the business community. For instance, banks can now
profitably compete with the surety industry in assuring performance of both domestic and international construction projects.3
1. The letter of credit has been a favorite credit device for centuries. It has been suggested that the letter of credit was used in ancient times by the Phoenicians, the Babylonians, the Assyrians and the Greeks. Wiley, How to Use Letters of Credit in Financing the
Sale of Goods, 20 Bus. LAW. 495 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wiley]. Others cite 575 B.C. as
the birth date of the letter of credit. W. WARD and H. HARFIELD, BANK CREDITS AND AccEPTANCES (4th ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as WARD & HARFI.LD]. Its traditional role has been
to finance the sale of goods between distant merchants unfamiliar with each other's reliability and creditworthiness. Wiley, supra, at 496. The stand-by letter of credit is a more recent
development. See Note, Recent Extensions in the Use of Commercial Letters of Credit, 66
YALE L. REV. 902 (1957). It has greatly increased the domestic use of the letter of credit. See
Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251 (1972).
2. 65 FED. RES. BULL. 716 (Sept. 1979).
3. Id.
4. See Murray, Letters of Credit in Non-Sale of Goods Transactions,30 Bus. LAW. 1103,
1104-05 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MURRAY] for a representative list of transactions in
which the stand-by letter of credit has been used,
5. See Note, Guaranty Letters of Credit: Problems and Possibilities, 16 ARIz. L. REV.
822, 826 (1974). The bank competes by charging the customer a much lower fee. Banks
generally issue stand-by letters of credit at a fee of 1/2% to 1% per annum of the face
amount of the credit. Surety companies charge a flat sliding-scale fee based on the size of
the construction contract involved, not the risk. For example, if a one-year construction
contract is worth $50,000,000, and the owner requires a $5,000,000 performance bond from
the contractor, the contractor's fee to the surety company for a bond would be $252,000; the
fee for a stand-by letter of credit would be closer to $25,000. Garman, Standby Letters of
Credit and Guarantees:Do We Understand What We're Doing, 1978 J. CoM. BANK LENDING 3, 8 [hereinafter cited as Garman]. The surety bond costs more simply because the
surety does more. Besides assuring itself that the contractor is financially able to complete
the contract, the surety company takes measures to prevent the contractor's default. See
text accompanying note 26 infra.
On the other hand, the bank which issues the stand-by letter of credit must never involve
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Furthermore, during tight money market periods, stand-by letters
of credit permit a bank to lend its credit instead of cash, at only a
fraction of the prime lending rate." The low cost and flexibility of
letters of credit and the engagement of a strong and reputable
financial institution in a transaction have attracted the business
community to stand-by letters of credit issued by banks.
However, the use of stand-by letters has created some legal
problems. Because the stand-by letter of credit promises payment
only upon the customer's default7 and has often been used in place
of the conventional guaranty, it has been characterized as a guaranty." Consequently, its issuance by banks has been challenged as
ultra vires. ° Since the bank's obligation to pay under the stand-by

itself in the performance of the contractor's contract. See notes 32 and 36 infra and accompanying text. The bank will rely solely on the presentment of documents informing it of the
contractor's default and its obligation to pay the owner. If the documents are in proper
order, the bank must pay. Thus, the bank's operational costs are much lower. The bank
needs no extensive technical knowledge about the construction industry; it need only do
what it does best - evaluate the creditworthiness of the contractor and his ability to repay
the bank if the owner draws on the letter of credit. See WARD & HARFIELD, supra note 1, at
135, 138. In fact, in his most recent edition, Harfield notes that sureties themselves are
giving greater priority to the financial standing of their customers. H. HAMImLD, BANK
CREDITS AND ACCEPTANCES (5th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as HARFIELD].
6. See Armstrong, The Letter of Credit as a Lending Device in a Tight Money Market,
22 Bus. LAW. 1105 (1967).
7. For the purpose of applying legal lending limits, the Comptroller of the Currency defines the stand-by letter of credit as "an obligation to the beneficiary on the part of the
issuer. . .to make payment on account of any default by the account party in the performance of an obligation." 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160(a) (1980). The Comptroller uses "account party"
to mean the bank's customer. See text accompanying notes 44 to 48 infra.
8. Murray, supra note 4, at 1103.
9. See Katskee, The Stand-by Letter of Credit Debate-The Case for Congressional
Resolution, 92 BANKING L.J. 697, 704 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Katskee]. See also Verkuil,
Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REv. 716, 734 (1973).
10. Katskee, supra note 9, at 704. In America, it has been generally held that a bank has
no power to guarantee the contracts of others in which it has no interest and from which it
derives no benefit. Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73 (5th Cir. 1922);
Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Pirie, 82 F. 799 (8th Cir. 1897); J. MoRsE, I BANKS AND BANKING
§ 65 (6th ed. 1928) [hereinafter cited as MoRsE]; C. ZOLLMANN, 8 BANKS AND BANKING § 5101
(1936). This prohibition applies especially to national banks. Bowen v. Needles Nat'l Bank,
94 F. 925 (9th Cir. 1899); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Pirie, 82 F. 799 (8th Cir. 1897). National banks are said to have only such powers as they are expressly given by statute. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 48-50 (1940). The courts have distinguished bank
guaranties of endorsement on checks handled for collection or re-discounted notes on the
theory that the bank is simply disposing of property it has lawfully acquired. Such practices
are deemed incidental to the business of banking and permitted by statutes. Cochran &
Sayre v. United States, 157 U.S. 286 (1895); People's Bank v. National Bank, 101 U.S. 1811
(1879); Merchants' Bank v. Baird, 160 F. 642 (8th Cir. 1908). The Comptroller of the Currency also permits a national bank "to become a guarantor, if it has a substantial interest in
the performance of the transaction... or has a segregated deposit sufficient... to cover the
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letter of credit becomes void if the letter is held to be a guaranty, 1
banks seeking to avoid12their payment obligations have raised the
"no guaranty" defense.

This challenge continues to jeopardize the utility of the stand-by
letter of credit, whose hallmark is the beneficiary's justified reliance on the bank's absolute promise to pay upon presentation of
proper documents. Although the stand-by letter of credit has been
sanctioned by the Comptroller of the Currency," s state regulatory
bank's total potential liability." 12 C.F.R. § 7.7010(a) (1980). The assumption has been that
lending credit creates too great a risk for the bank, which acts as a fiduciary for its depositors. Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Controversy, 96 BANKING L.J. 46 (1979). One commentator summed it up: "Indeed, lending credit is the exact
opposite of lending money, which is the real business of a bank." MoasE, supra, at 184.
However, the courts have continually upheld a bank's power to issue letters of credit. See,
e.g., Second Nat'l Bank v. Columbia Trust Co., 288 F. 17 (3d Cir. 1923); Border Nat'l Bank
v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73 (5th Cir. 1922); Lamborn v. National Park Bank, 212
App. Div. 25, 208 N.Y.S. 428 (1925). See also WARD & HARFIELD, supra note 1, at 135.
11. See Merchants Bank v. Baird, 160 F. 642 (8th Cir. 1908); Commercial Nat'l Bank v.
Pirie, 82 F. 799 (8th Cir. 1897); C.E. Healey & Son v. Stewardson Nat'l Bank, 285 Ill. App.
290, 1 N.E.2d 858 (1936); First Nat'l Bank v. National Produce Bank, 239 Ill. App. 376
(1926).
12.. Generally, banks refuse payment under their stand-by letters of credit for one of two
reasons. A bank may not understand the stand-by letter of credit and, thus, may make an
improper credit decision. See Harfield, Code, Customs and Conscience in Letter-of-Credit
Law, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 7, 14 (1972). Because no party to the credit anticipates drawing under the
credit, a bank officer may agree to issue a stand-by letter of credit for a customer whose
financial condition would not justify granting a loan of money, see Harfield, The Increasing
Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251, 258 (1972), or the bank may fail to
prudently secure itself against an unexpected demand for payment under the letter. When
the demand is then made, the bank refuses payment in a belated effort to protect itself. The
Federal Reserve Board has attempted to discourage this practice. In regulating state member banks, the Board requires that the issuance of stand-by letters of credit be subject to
the same credit analysis as potential loans. 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d)(2)(ii) (1980).
Alternatively, a dispute may arise between the customer and the beneficiary. The customer may then pressure the bank to dishonor the beneficiary's demand for payment. If the
bank values its relationship with the customer, it may accept the customer's indemnification
and refuse payment. In Talbot v. Bank of Hendersonville, 495 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1972), the customer convinced the bank to withhold payment for about 45 days after demand for payment was made. The bank finally paid the beneficiary over the customer's
objections.
13. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1160 (1980). Although the regulation does not expressly permit
stand-by letters of credit, it subjects the stand-by letter of credit to the federal legal lending
limit requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976), implying that national banks may issue standby letters of credit. Similar provisions can be found in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's regulations on state non-member banks, 12 C.F.R. § 337.2(b) (1980), and the Federal Reserve's regulations of state member banks, 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(d)(2)(i) (1980).
A recent commentator suggests that a 1977 amendment to the Comptroller's regulations
sanctions stand-by letters of credit by what it does not say. Although 12 C.F.R. § 7.7016
(1980) describes sound banking practices for letters of credit, it also authorizes national
banks to issue any letter of credit permissible under the Uniform Commercial Code or the
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authority"' and case law, 15 the guaranty prohibition lives on. A
clear and effective test for courts and practitioners to distinguish
the valid stand-by letter of credit from the ultra vires guaranty is
necessary to discourage banks from proliferating the stand-by letter of credit when it suits them, but undermining its efficacy when
it does not. Many courts have recently struggled with the stand-by
letter of credit/guaranty question and have discovered a valuable
test in Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code: sections 5-102
and 5-103.
The standard form of the letter of credit prescribed by sections
5-102 and 5-103, as interpreted by the courts, should assist banks'
counsel in drafting an instrument that avoids an ultra vires challenge. The courts' implementation of sections 5-102 and 5-103 to
spurn the guaranty defense should dissuade banks from improperly refusing payment under the stand-by letter of credit. Beneficiaries applying this test should recognize when a bank's instrument is susceptible to a subsequent guaranty attack. This may
avoid possible litigation and excessive losses due to misplaced
reliance.
The purpose of this article is to describe the tests under sections
5-102 and 5-103 which assist in distinguishing the stand-by letter
of credit from the guaranty and to review recent court implementation of these tests when faced with a guaranty challenge. After a
discussion of the differences among the stand-by letter of credit,
its traditional counterpart and the common law guaranty, Code
sections 5-102 and 5-103 will be examined. Finally, the courts' interpretations, applications, and misapplications of these two sections, as well as the courts' general rejection of the guaranty defense, will be explored.
THE LETTER OF CiDTrr/GuAANwrY DISTINCTION
To appreciate the utility of sections 5-102 and 5-103, it is necessary to understand the way in which the recently developed standby letter of credit differs from both the guaranty and the traditional letter of credit. The letter of credit and the guaranty both

Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. The regulation conspicuously does
not prohibit stand-by letters of credit as an unsound banking practice. See Comment, Letters of Credit: Current Theories and Usages, 39 LA. L. Rav. 581, 621 (1979).
14. See, e.g., the New Jersey Department of Banking regulations for stand-by letters of
credit cited in New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 N.J. 33, 389 A.2d 454 (1978).
15. See text accompanying notes 71-106 infra.
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fulfill the "assurance" function.

Both instruments assure a third

party of the bargained-for performance (often payment) of an underlying contract with the issuer's customer. However, although

the letter of credit and guaranty have the same general function,
they operate differently. Because of this difference, and because of
their diverse historical beginnings,1 7 two distinct sets of legal principles have developed around their use.
The Guaranty
The surety who issues the guaranty" is concerned with actual
performance.10 He undertakes to provide the performance 0 promised by his principal to a third party should the principal default.2 1
For instance, in a construction project, the surety's activities might

16. "Indeed, the essential distinction between the letter of credit and the contract of
guaranty is purely formal, not functional." Bank of North Carolina v. Rock Island Bank, 570
F.2d 202, 206 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978).
Harfield has noted, "A letter of credit always serves as a guaranty." Harfield, Code Treatment of Letters of Credit, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 92, 93 (1962). Early use of the letter of credit in
America illustrated this similarity of function. Professor K. N. Llewellyn described it thus:
"In the first decades, in domestic commerce, the letter of credit appears chiefly in the form
of a guaranty addressed by one merchant to another," reprinted in HARFIELD, supra note 5,
at 165. Both the instrument and the courts often used the terms letter of credit and guaranty interchangeably. See, e.g., Decatur Bank v. St. Louis Bank, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 294
(1874); Omaha Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 59 111.428 (1871). Indeed, it is ironic that
after strongly admonishing banks against issuing guaranties, Morse distinguished a letter of
credit from a guaranty with this definition: "A letter of credit is a guaranty to be responsible for the debt of another." MORSE, supra note 3, at 185 (emphasis added).
17. See note 1 supra. By the 17th century, the letter of credit was a highly developed
tool of international trade for European merchants. Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of the
Irrevocable CommercialLetter of Credit, 14 Am. J. Comp. L. 395 (1965). The governing legal
principles were thus shaped by civil law doctrines and the law merchant. Hershey, Letters of
Credit, 32 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1918). On the other hand, the guaranty has a long tradition in
the common law. See Loyd, The Surety, 66 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1917); Morgan, The History
and Economics of Suretyship, 12 CORr.L L.Q. 153 (1927).
18. "Surety" is used herein in its broad sense as synonymous with guarantor. L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF SURETYSHIP 6 (1950) [hereinafter cited as SIMPSON]. It refers
to the surety who is secondarily liable, in contrast to the surety who has a primary obligation. Id. at 8 n.10. This is consistent with the use of the term by courts and commentators.
See, e.g., Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Tex. 1978);
American Empire Ins. Co. v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 409 F. Supp. 459, 464 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
See also WARD & HARFIELD, supra note 1, at 133.
19. WARD & HARFImLD, supra note 1, at 132.

.20. Instead of promising to complete performance, the surety may just promise to pay
agreed-upon damages for the principal's failure to perform. WARD & HARFIELD, supra note
1, at 132.
21. Id. See also SIMPsoN, supra note 18, at 10. The guaranty has often been defined as a
promise to answer for some debt of another. See, e.g., Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l
Bank, 282 F. 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1922).
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include monitoring the contractor's progress, redressing the owner's complaints concerning job quality, assisting a financially
stricken contractor, or even hiring a new contractor to complete
the job. 2' Thus, the surety's interest lies in the fulfillment of the
contract. His obligation to the third party, however, always remains secondary.2 3 The third party may look to the surety only
after the principal has, in fact, defaulted.
For his part, the principal promises to reimburse the surety only
if he actually defaults.2 5 Before the surety advances funds, therefore, it is prudent that he inquire into the actual fact of the principal's default. 26 He must determine whether there has been a default to be certain of his recovery from the principal. In addition,
since the guarantor's obligation is dependent upon the principal's
obligation, any defenses which relieve the principal of his obligation to the third party may be raised by the surety as well.27 The
secondary nature of the surety's obligation, which depends on the
actual facts of the customer's performance, makes the guaranty
quite a different instrument from the letter of credit.
The Letter of Credit
The issuer of a letter of credit is not concerned with the actual
performance of the contract between the customer and the third
party (the beneficiary). Rather, the issuer's only interest is documents. 26 The issuer of a letter of credit promises to pay the beneficiary upon receipt of documents specified in the letter. Section 5103 of the Uniform Commercial Code defines a letter of credit as
22. GARMAN, supra note 5, at 7-8.
23. SIMPsoN, supra note 18, at 10.
24. The third party must look first to the principal for performance. Only when the
principal has unjustifiably failed to perform may the third party turn to the surety. See
American Empire Ins. Co. v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 409 F. Supp. 459, 464 (M.D. Pa. 1976). If,
however, the principal's failure to perform is justified, the surety's obligation, secondary to
the principal's, is also discharged. See SIMPSON, supra note 18, at 265-295.
25. SIMPSON, supra note 18, at 226. However, if the principal has valid defenses for nonperformance or against the third party, and the surety knows of these defenses, the principal may raise them against the surety as well. SIMPSON, supra note 18, at 229. Thus, a contractor may refuse to reimburse the surety for the completion of a construction project if the
contractor had good defenses for non-completion. See WARD & HARFIELD, supra note 1, at
134.
26. WARD & HARFIELD, supra note 1, at 133-134.
27. SIMPSON, supra note 18, at 265-295.
28. WARD & HARFIFLD, supra note 1, at 134. See also Courtaulds N. America, Inc. v. N.
Carolina Nat'l Bank, 528 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1975); Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens &
Southern Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Intraworld Indus., Inc. v.
Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 357, 336 A.2d 316, 323 (1975).
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"an engagement by a bank or other person made at the request of
a customer. . .that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands
for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the
credit..
"29 The actual performance of the customer's contract
is irrelevant to the issuer's obligation to pay."0 In fact, courts have
often said the issuer must not even inquire into the actual facts of
the underlying contract.3 1 The Code expresses this important principle in section 5-114(1): "An issuer must honor a draft or demand
for payment which complies with the terms of the relevant credit
regardless of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer
and the beneficiary ..
."al The issuer focuses solely on documentary compliance with the conditions set forth in the letter.
Like the surety's principal, the customer promises to reimburse
the issuer for proper payment." Proper payment is predicated
upon presentation of complying documents, however, not upon the
customer's actual performance.3 ' Both the issuer's promise to pay
the beneficiary and the customer's promise to reimburse the issuer
are conditioned upon proper documentation. These obligations are
separate and independent of the underlying contract between the
customer and the beneficiary. 85 Therefore, unlike the guarantor,36

29. U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(a) (1978 version).
30. See, e.g., Barclays Bank v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F.
73, 79 (5th Cir. 1922).
31. "Absent its agreement to the contrary, the issuer is, under the general rule, not required or even permitted to go behind the documents to determine if the beneficiary has
performed in conformity with the underlying contract." Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard
Trust Bank, 461 Pa. 343, 357, 336 A.2d 316, 323 (1975). Accord, Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1970); Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 298 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1962); Dynamics Corp. of America v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l
Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239
N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925).
32. U.C.C. § 5-114(1) (1978 version).
33. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1978 version). See Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F.
S'ipp. 1021, 1024 (N.D. 11. 1975); Second Nat'l Bank v. M. Samuel & Sons, 12 F.2d 963, 966
(1926).
34. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1978 version).
35. There are three separate and independent contracts in a letter of credit transaction:
the contract between the customer and the beneficiary, often called the "underlying contract"; the contract between the issuer and the beneficiary to pay upon proper documentation; and the contract of reimbursement between the issuer and the customer. Venizelos,
S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1970); Dynamics Corp. of
America v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 995 (N.D. Ga. 1973). This
independence of obligations means that a breakdown in the underlying contract will have no
effect on either the issuer's obligation to pay the beneficiary or the customer's obligation to
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the issuer who refuses to pay cannot assert the customer's defenses7
arising from the factual circumstances of the underlying contract;1
nor can the customer employ these defenses to avoid reimbursement. s8 In contrast to the secondary obligation of the guaranty, the
letter of credit creates a primary obligation of the issuer to the
beneficiary.3 9 These principles apply whether the credit is of the
traditional merchandise variety or is a stand-by letter of credit.
The Traditional Letter of Credit
The traditional letter of credit is employed in the sale of goods.40
The seller receives the bank's promise to pay the purchase price of
the merchandise as specified in the letter. The seller must present
documents which evidence proper shipment of the purchased
goods, usually bills of lading, invoices, certificates of insurance or
the like.4 1 The buyer and seller, in effect, agree that the seller will
no longer look to the buyer for payment. He will, instead, rely primarily on the bank to pay him. The bank expects that, if all goes
well, it will be called upon to pay*the seller. 42 Thus, in the tradireimburse the issuer. See, e.g., Brummer v. Bankers Trust, 268 S.C. 21, 231 S.E.2d 298
(1977); Talbot v. Bank of Hendersonville, 495 S.W.2d 548 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
36. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
37. See Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, 239 N.Y. 386, 146 N.E. 636 (1925).
38. See Note, Recent Extensions in the Use of Commercial Letters of Credit, 66 YALE
L. REv. 902, 904 n.8 (1957); WARD & HARFIELD, supra note 1, at 78, 80.
39. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 394 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Barclays
Bank v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1139 (1974); Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73 (5th Cir. 1922).
40. See note 1 supra.
41. See S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 212 (1970)
for an excellent description of a typical merchandise letter of credit transaction.
42. Prior to issuing the credit, the bank can take a security interest in the negotiable
documents of title, the merchandise and the proceeds from the sale of the goods. Kozolchyk,
Legal Aspects of Letters of Credit and Related Secured Transactions, 11 LAW. OF THE
AMERICAS 265, 273 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kozolchyk]. Such security interest is temporarily perfected without filing for 21 days after execution of the security agreement. U.C.C.
§ 9-304(4) (1978 version). The bank may also require that it be shown as titleholder of the
goods in the documents of title as security for prompt reimbursement by the buyer-customer. If the documents of title are in the name of the customer, the bank can create a
security interest in them by releasing them to the customer under a trust receipt.
Kozolchyk, supra, at 273. This security interest is also temporarily perfected for 21 days
without filing a financing statement. U.C.C. § 9-304(5) (1978 version).
Since the stand-by letter of credit transaction usually does not involve a sale of goods,
some argue that it is a much more risky affair. See, e.g., Verkuil, Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit, 25 STAN. L. REv. 716, 723 (1973). However, the issuer of a stand-by
letter of credit can protect itself by requiring the customer to deposit a segregated fund to
cover the amount of the credit. Kozolchyk, supra, at 273. The bank should view the credit
as any other loan and take collateral, if necessary. Recent empirical evidence of the rela-
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tional merchandise letter of credit, the bank's obligation is primary, not secondary, to the customer's obligation to perform.
The Stand-by Letter of Credit
The primary obligation of the issuer to the beneficiary is not so
readily apparent in a stand-by letter of credit.43 The bank issuing
such a letter in effect promises to pay the beneficiary if the customer defaults in performance of the underlying contract." For example, when a bank's customer borrows money from another bank,
the first bank might issue a letter of credit as collateral for the
loan, promising to pay the note if the customer does not.4" A bank
may issue a letter of credit to an insurance company promising to
pay liquidated damages if the customer fails to take a mortgage
loan offered by the insurance company.46 In either example, all
parties to the transaction expect the customer to complete his
promised performance. The beneficiary looks to the customer to
pay the loan or take the mortgage. The bank only "stands by" in
case the customer defaults. No one expects a draw on the bank's
letter of credit. 47 Whereas the traditional letter of credit will be
drawn upon "if all goes well," the stand-by letter of credit will only
be drawn upon if all does not. 6 In this sense, it operates exactly
like a guaranty.
Nevertheless, the distinction between a stand-by letter and a
guaranty lies in the documentary nature of the letter of credit. The
bank issuer will pay the beneficiary not when the customer in fact
defaults, but when it receives documents which notify it of that
default. 49 In the examples above, the bank would pay upon receipt
tively risk-free nature of the stand-by letter as compared to bank loans is found in a report
in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, which relates that although stand-by letters of credit have
the same risk potential as direct loans, in practice they result in much lower losses. 65 FED.
RES. BULL. 716 (Sept. 1979).
43. See Katskee, supra note 9, at 701. In fact, early commentators discussed the standby letter of credit as a "secondary" payment device. Note, Recent Extensions in the Use of
Commercial Letters of Credit, 66 YALE L. REv. 902, 904 (1957).
44. Harfleld, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251, 258
(1972).
45. See New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 N.J. 33, 389 A.2d 454 (1978).
46. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 378 A.2d 562 (1977).
47. H. Arnold & E. Brandsilver, The Standby Letter of Credit-The Controversy Continues, 10 U.C.C.L.J. 272, 279 (1978).
48. Harfield describes these as "psychological opposites." Harfield, The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter of Credit, 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251, 258 (1972).
49. An obvious risk for the customer is that the beneficiary will fraudulently notify the
issuer of a non-existent default. The leading pre-Code case dealing with the problem of
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of its customer's past due promissory note50 or on the insurance

company's written declaration that the bank's customer failed to
take the mortgage.51 Thus, the bank's obligation is not dependent
upon the actual facts of the underlying contract; it is an independent and primary obligation to pay the beneficiary upon receipt of
proper documents. 52
Therefore, although the surety and the issuer of a letter of credit
both perform the "assurance" function, they operate quite differently. The surety performs the "assurance" function by inquiring
into the nature of the underlying contract and making certain that
his principal has, in fact, failed to perform a proper obligation. In
contrast, the issuer of a letter of credit performs the "assurance"
fraudulent documentation in a sale of goods credit is Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroeder Banking
Corp., 177 Misc. 719, 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1941). The beneficiary in that case had
contracted to sell the bank's customer certain bristles. Although the documents received by
the bank described the proper bristles required under the letter of credit, the customer
claimed that the material shipped was, in fact, "cowhair, other worthless material and rubbish." 31 N.Y.S.2d at 633. The customer brought an action to restrain the bank from paying
the beneficiary against fraudulent documents. The court found that the general rule of independence of contracts in a letter of credit transaction was applicable to cases of breach of
warranty in the underlying contract, but that this principle "should not be extended to
protect the unscrupulous seller." Id. at 634. The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action.
The rule of Sztejn is codified in U.C.C. § 5-114(2). It permits a bank acting in good faith
to decide on its own whether or not to pay the beneficiary upon documents which comply on
their face, despite the claim that the documents are forged or fraudulent, or that "there is
fraud in the transaction." However, in keeping with Sztejn, the customer may seek to enjoin
such payment. This remedy is not available against a holder in due course of defective documents or the bona fide purchaser of securities. U.C.C. § 5-114(2)(a).
Questions remain. What kind of fraud is necessary to permit dishonor? Does "fraud in the
transaction" include the underlying contract or only the face of the documents? Should the
bank have the discretion to dishonor documents which comply on their face? These questions are discussed and solutions suggested in Note, Letters of Credit:Injunction as a Remedy for Fraudin U.C.C. Section 5-114, 63 MINN. L. REv. 487 (1978). See'also Siderius, Inc.
v. Wallace Co., 583 S.W.2d 852 (Tex Ct. App. 1979); O'Grady v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 296
N.C. 212, 250 S.E.2d 587 (1978).
Due to the recent political turmoil in Iran, several U.S. concerns sought injunctions
against honor of stand-by letters of credit issued in favor of Iranian banks. Each customer
alleged fraud under U.C.C. § 5-114(2). In each case, the appellate court refused to enjoin
payment under the letter of credit because the parties failed to prove fraud. KMW Int'l v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 606 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1979); United Technologies Corp. v. Citibank,
469 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); American Bell Int'l v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 27 U.C.C.
REP. SERV.

223 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1979).

50. New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 N.J. 33, 389 A.2d 454 (1978).
51. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 173 Conn. 492, 378 A.2d
562 (1977).
52. New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 77 N.J. 33, 389 A.2d 454, 459 (1978). See note 44
supra and accompanying text.
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function by receiving the documents that inform him of either the
beneficiary's performance or the customer's lack of performance of
their obligations in the underlying contract. This difference in
method makes the surety's obligation secondary, and allows him to
stand in the shoes of the principal in case of nonpayment. The
issuer's obligation, on the other hand, is always primary, and he
may raise none of the customer's defenses for non-payment.
THE TEST PROVIDED BY SECTIONS

5-102

AND

5-103:

SCOPE AND DEFINITION

Since a bank's instrument will be void as ultra vires if it is held
to be a guaranty,"8 a court must determine whether the instrument
in question is an invalid guaranty or a valid stand-by letter of
credit. Merely to describe the issuer's obligation under a letter of
credit as "primary" is inadequate, particularly with the stand-by
letter of credit, in which the issuer's obligation appears to be secondary to the customer's duty to perform. The documentary requirement gives rise to the issuer's primary obligation to the beneficiary and distinguishes a stand-by letter of credit from a
guaranty. Yet, since the assurance function is common to both instruments, form becomes decisive. 5 4 The first step must be to de53. See note 10 supra.
54. See Bank of N. Carolina v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202, 206 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978).
Early cases held that the letter of credit need take no particular form. Violett v. Patton, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 142 (1809); Border Nat'l Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 282 F. 73 (5th Cir.
1922). However, more recent commentators have recognized that the form of the instrument
is material in determining its usefulness as a letter of credit. Kozolchyk thoroughly studied
the use of the modern letter of credit and determined that "[als a formal promise, the letter
of credit may no longer be treated as an instrument whose form is immaterial and whose
requisites are to be determined by random considerations." Kozolchyk, The Legal Nature of
the Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit, 14 Am. J. CoMP. L. 395, 421 (1965). Speaking
of the recent burgeoning of stand-by letters of credit, Armstrong found that "it is apparent
at this point that in the world of documentary credits form is everything. That is so because
without its special attributes of form, the [stand-by] arrangement described takes on the
cast-or pallor-of acceptances, guaranties, and suretyship agreements ..
" Armstrong,
The Letter of Credit as a Lending Device in a Tight Money Market, 22 Bus. LAW. 1105,
1107 (1967). See also HARFIELD, supra note 5, at 176.
The modern merchandise letter of credit is not normally confused with the guaranty, because it has developed a highly specialized form through extensive use in international
trade. This form has been solidified in the Uniform Customs and Practice for Commerical
Documentary Credits (UCP) of the International Chamber of Commerce, which has been
widely adopted by the commercial community since its introduction in 1929. The UCP is a
compilation of existing business practice and law pertaining to the commercial merchandise
letter of credit. See Wheble, Uniform Customs and Practicefor Documentary Credits 1971
Revision, 4 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 97 (1971); Note, Revised InternationalRules for Documentary Credits, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1952).
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termine whether the instrument fits within the documentary format of the stand-by letter of credit.
Sections 5-102 and 5-103 provide the courts with the standard
form by which to measure the instrument in question. The drafters
of Article 5 recognized that form is determinative in distinguishing
the letter of credit from other, similar instruments. They established three form tests" in sections 5-102(1)(a), (b) and (c) and
incorporated them into the definition of "letter of credit" found in
section 5-103(1)(a).
Section 5-102 describes the scope of Article 5, Letters of Credit.
Its purpose is to delineate the transactions to which letter of credit
legal principles will apply." Article 5 applies to letters of credit
regardless of the nature of the underlying transaction. 7 It does not
differentiate in any way between the merchandise and the standby letter of credit. Sections 5-102(1)(a) and (b) illustrate the primary distinction between the letter of credit and the guaranty, i.e.,
reliance on documents.
Section 5-102(1)(a)" provides that a credit issued by a bank falls
within the scope of Article 5 when that credit requires for payment
a documentary draft or documentary demand for payment. Under
section 5-102(1)(b)," a credit issued by a person other than a bank
is within Article 5 if the credit calls for a document of title to accompany the draft or demand for payment.60

In contrast, the stand-by letter. of credit has been utilized in such a great variety of situations that it is difficult to recognize any particular attributes. See note 4 supra. This further
confounds the courts faced with the task of distinguishing the almost indistinguishable
stand-by letter of credit from the ordinary guaranty.
55. Section 5-104 sets out the "formal requirements" of the letter of credit. It codifies
the early common law rule that a letter of credit need follow no particular form. See note 54
supra. No special phrasing is necessary, except as may be required by § 5-102(1)(c). The
credit must be in writing and it must be signed. U.C.C. § 5-104(1)(a) (1978 version). The
term "form test" is used in this article in response to contemporary commentators and
courts who have emphasized that the stand-by letter of credit is identical to the guaranty in
its "assurance" function and that the real distinction lies in form. See note 58 infra and
accompanying text.
56. Comment to U.C.C. § 5-102 (1978 version).
57. O'Grady v. First Union Bank, 296 N.C. 212, 231, 250 S.E.2d 587, 599 (1978).
58. "(1) This Article applies (a) to a credit issued by a bank if the credit requires a
documentary draft or a documentary demand for payment.
U.C.C. § 5-102(1)(a) (1978
version).
59. "(1) This Article applies. . .(b) to a credit issued by a person other than a bank if
the credit requires that the draft or demand for payment be accompanied by a document of
title ....
" U.C.C. § 5-102(1)(b) (1978 version).
60. Whereas a bank issuing a letter of credit may require that any document, as defined
in § 5-103(1)(b), accompany the draft or demand for payment, a letter of credit issued by
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Section 5-102(1)(c)" provides the exception to the documentary
nature of the stand-by letter of credit. If the instrument does not
comply with either section 5-102(1)(a) or (b), and yet states conspicuously that it is a "letter of credit," it may be construed as one
under Article 5., This section gives effect to the express intention
of the parties to utilize a letter of credit and benefit from the letter
of credit legal principles, without requiring documents for
payment. 5s
Section 5-102(2)" ' illustrates the drafters' recognition of the similarities between the letter of credit, the guaranty and other instruments. It expresses the rule that the form of the instrument, as
described in section 5-102(1), distinguishes those instruments
which will be construed as letters of credit from those which fall
outside the scope of Article 5."

any other person must require a document of title. However, the practical effect of these
strict rules is weakened by the §5-102(1)(c) exception. See notes 94 to 106 infra and accompanying text.
61. "(1) This Article applies. . .(c) to a credit issued by a bank or other person if the
credit is not within subparagraphs (a) or (b) but conspicuously states that it is a letter of
credit or is conspicuously so entitled." U.C.C. § 5-102(1)(c) (1978 version).
62. Comment 1 to § 5-102 suggests that § 5-102(1)(c) authorizes a "clean" credit - one
that requires no documents. However, § 5-102(1)(c) credits still require "a draft or other
demand for payment" pursuant to the definition of letter of credit in § 5-103(1)(a). Compared to §§ 5-102(1)(a) and (b), which the Comment refers to as "mandatory" sections, this
section is considered "permissive." Although these labels are left unexplained by the Comment, it appears that the letters which take the specified form of § 5-102(1)(a) or (b) will be
held to be letters of credit regardless of the intention of the parties, whereas a letter which
falls under § 5-102(1)(c) will be permitted to stand as a letter of credit when the parties'
intention to enter into a letter of credit agreement is clear. The Comment further indicates
that both banks and other parties may issue "clean" credits. For an example of a "clean"
credit transaction, see Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Ill.
1975). See also note 113 infra and accompanying text.
63. However, precisely because this section eschews the documentary requirement, its
application to the stand-by letter of credit is problematic. If the distinction between the
stand-by credit and the guaranty lies in the documentary format of the letter of credit,
when the documentary requirement is eliminated, a crucial feature is lost. See text accompanying notes 107 to 122 infra.
64. "(2) Unless the engagement meets the requirements of subsection (1), this Article
does not apply to engagements to make advances or to honor drafts or demands for payment, to authorities to pay or purchase, to guarantees or to general agreements." U.C.C. § 5102(2) (1978 version).
65. Section 5-102(3) contains a caveat:
(3) This Article deals with some but not all the rules and concepts of letters of
credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act or may hereafter
develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not by itself require, imply or
negate application of the same or a converse rule to a situation not provided for or
to a person not specified by this Article.
U.C.C. § 5-102(3) (1978 version). This section provides flexibility for adaptation to new de-
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Letter of credit, as well as other termB germane to the stand-by
credit/guaranty controversy, are defined in section 5-103. The
Code's definition of letter of credit"6 as an engagement that falls
within the scope of Article 5, makes sections 5-102 and 5-103 interdependent. To be a stand-by letter of credit, the instrument must
meet the definition of letter of credit. To meet that definition, the
instrument must fall within the scope of Article 5. If it passes the
acid test of form under sections 5-102(1)(a), (b) or (c), the instrument may be upheld as a stand-by letter of credit and not a
velopments in commercial practice. The comments state "that in the present state of the
law and variety of practices as to letters of credit, no statute can effectively or wisely codify
all possible law of letters of credit without stultifying further development of this useful
financing device." U.C.C. § 5-102, Comment 2 (1978 version).
Some courts have considered this section, combined with Comment 2 and § 5-102(1)(c),
allowing for "clean" letters of credit, to be statutory authority for the stand-by letter of
credit. See, e.g., Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Tex.
1978), where the court noted that there was no "express statutory foundation" for the
stand-by letter of credit; Barclays Bank v. Merchantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224, 1232 n.1l
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974). The courts rely on the concerted effect of
these provisions because the stand-by letter of credit is a recent newcomer to the commercial scene and the Code nowhere explicitly sanctions its use. However, reliance solely on
these sections, especially § 5-102(1)(c), to justify the existence of the stand-by letter of
credit is unnecessary and misleading. Section 5-102(1)(c) authorizes an instrument which
does not meet the documentary form requirements of §§ 5-102(1)(a) or (b) - the "clean,"
non-documentary credit. However, most stand-by credits do require documents as defined
by § 5-103(1)(b). For examples of the documents required, see In Re Marine Distributors,
Inc., 522 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1975) (endorsed promissory note and signed statement that
beneficiary had presented promissory note to customer and had not received payment);
Beathard v. Chicago Football Club, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (signed affidavit
that customer had not paid beneficiary's wages for a football game); American Empire Ins..
Co. v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 409 F. Supp. 459 (M.D. Pa. 1976)(certificate that beneficiary had
incurred an obligation under its surety bond issued on behalf of customer); Chase Manhattan Bank v. Equibank, 394 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (certificate that customer had
defaulted on construction loan commitment and had failed to cure default); Dovenmuehle,
Inc. v. East Bank, 196 Colo. 422, 589 P.2d 1361 (1978) (signed certificate that draft drawn
covered loan balance); Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Percy Wilson Mortgage & Finance Corp., 44
Ill. App. 3d 220, 357 N.E.2d 1307 (1976) (signed certificate that monies were due and owing
from customer on an FHA project); Intraworld Indus., Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 461 Pa.
343, 336 A.2d 316 (1975) (signed statement that lessee had not paid rent installments).
These cases illustrate that § 5-102(1)(a) is often the "express statutory foundation" for
the stand-by letter of credit.
66. Section 5-103(1)(a) of the U.C.C. (1978 version) provides:
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(a) "Credit" or "letter of credit" means an engagement by a bank or other
person made at the request of a customer and of a kind within the scope of
this Article (Section 5-102) that the issuer will honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions specified in the
credit. A credit may be either revocable or irrevocable. The engagement
may be either an agreement to honor or a statement that the bank or other
person is authorized to honor.
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guaranty.
The Steps in the Analysis
The analysis required to identify a bank's instrument as a standby letter of credit thus moves back and forth through sections 5102 and 5-103. Section 5-102 begins, "This Article applies to a
credit. . . .,6 The definition of credit is found not in Section 5102 but in Section 5-103(1)(a). A credit, or letter of credit, is an
engagement entered into at the request of a customer to honor
drafts or demands for payment that comply with specified conditions. Moreover, such engagement must fall within the scope of Article 5.
Here the analysis shifts back to Section 5-102(1)(a). For a bank
issuer, the engagement, to fall within the scope of Article 5 as a
letter of credit, must require a documentary draft or documentary
demand for payment. "Documentary draft" and "documentary demand for payment" are defined in section 5-103(1)(b) as a draft or
demand for payment which will be honored only if documents are
presented. 8 Section 5-103(1)(b) defines "document" as "any paper" and includes such examples as document of title, certificate,
and notice of default.6 9
Thus, section 5-102(1)(a), in conjunction with section 5-103, requires that the bank's instrument, to be a letter of credit, must be
documentary in form. It must: first, be issued at the request of a
customer; second, promise to pay a draft or a demand for payment;
and third, be conditioned upon presentation of documents. If the
instrument meets these formal requirements, it is a stand-by letter
of credit and the analysis ends.
If, however, a documentary draft or documentary demand for
payment is not required, this does not mean that the instrument is
not a stand-by letter of credit. A final step in the analysis is necessary. Despite the lack of the documentary format, the instrument
may be a stand-by letter of credit if, pursuant to section 5102(1)(c), the instrument is entitled "letter of credit" or these
words are conspicuously stated therein. 0
67. U.C.C. § 5-102(1)(a) (1978 version) (emphasis added).
68. "A 'documentary draft' or a 'documentary demand for payment' is one honor of
which is conditioned upon the presentation of a document or documents. 'Document' means
any paper including document of title, security, invoice, certificate, notice of default and the
like." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(b) (1978 version).
69. Id.
70. See note 61 supra. The Code defines "conspicuous" in § 1-201(10): "a term or clause
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Judicial Application of Sections 5-102 and 5-103
Recent cases illustrate the courts' first applications of sections 5102 and 5-103 to the stand-by letter of credit in the face of a guaranty challenge. The cases reveal the courts' willingness to analyze
the Code in ways that will support the validity of this commercially useful instrument. They also provide insight into latent ambiguities in the Code which future judicial construction must
resolve.
The most difficult instrument for the courts to identify is one
that has no label and appears to be a bona fide guaranty. The
courts have turned to sections 5-102(1)(a) and 5-103(1)(a) and (b)
for guidance. The Code provides valuable assistance, but not without an interpretive struggle for the proper statutory construction
of the words "document," "documentary draft" and "documentary
demand."
In Bank of North Carolinav. Rock Island Bank,7 1 the defendant
Rock Island Bank addressed a letter to its customer, stating, "We
hereby issue to [customer], our irrevocable and unconditional commitment to purchase your Promissory Note of this date. .. .
Rock Island agreed to purchase the note from any holder in due
course at maturity, and required from the holder sixty days' written notice of its intent to sell the note to the bank. In its last paragraph the letter stated, "We hereby agree with the drawers, endorsers, and bona fide holders that this credit will be duly honored
on presentation. .... -7.
Here, then, was a letter that was not conspicuously labeled a letter of credit, was not addressed to a beneficiary, but to a customer,7 4" did not require a draft for payment, and was not even

is conspicuous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate
ought to have noticed it. . . . Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous" if it is in
larger or other contrasting type or color. . .. Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or
not is for decision by the court."
71. 570 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1978).
72. Id. at 204.
73. Id.
74. This letter contained two obligations: a promise by the bank to its customer to
purchase the customer's note and a promise to any endorsers or bona fide holders to honor
this commitment to purchase the note. Thus, the holders and endorsers were the beneficiaries of the letter; pursuant to § 5-103(1)(d) they were "entitled under [the] terms [of the
credit] to draw or demand payment." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(d) (1978 version). Cf. Johnston v.
State Bank, 195 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Iowa, 1972), where the court refused to uphold an instrument as a letter of credit because "[tihe essential element of a letter of credit which is
absent here is a direct promise by the bank to pay the addressee of the letter" (emphasis
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conditioned upon the default of the customer. The instrument did
state that it was a credit, albeit inconspicuously in the body of the
letter. It also created an engagement to pay drawers, endorsers and
bona fide holders. The specified condition for payment was presentation of the promissory note.
On the same day the letter was issued, the customer signed a
promissory note with another bank for the amount specified in the
letter. This note eventually was purchased by the plaintiff, Bank of
North Carolina, who, as a holder in due course, presented the note
to Rock Island for payment in compliance with the terms of the
letter. Rock Island refused to purchase the note, alleging that the
letter was an illegal guaranty. The trial court found this letter to
be "functionally indistinguishable""" from guaranties held to be illegal by earlier Illinois courts, 6 and it dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The court first recognized that
letters of credit serve a guaranty function, but reasoned that enforcement should not be denied simply on that basis." The court
then allowed that the "essential distinction" between a letter of
credit and a guaranty is "purely formal" and drew a further distinction between a "true contract of guaranty" and a " 'guaranty'
letter of credit": the obligation imposed by the latter is dependent
on the presentation of documents, not upon the fact of default.78
The court reviewed the definition of letter of credit contained in
section 5-103(1)(a) and determined that a letter of credit must fall
within the scope of Article 5. The court then turned to section 5102 to determine whether Rock Island's letter met one of the three
form tests. It found that the letter did not conspicuously state that
it was a letter of credit, and that it was not so entitled. Thus, the
added). In Johnston, the letter was addressed to a third party, but simply advised him of
the bank's commitment to grant a real estate mortgage loan to its customer. In Rock Island,
although the letter was addressed to the bank's customer, and not to a third party, it did
contain a direct promise to pay third parties.
Rock Island's letter is akin to the general letter of credit, utilized in earlier times, which
was addressed to no one person in particular and "confer[red] upon anyone who [would] act
thereon the power of becoming a creditor of the issuer." Hershey, Letters of Credit, 32
HARV. L. REv. 1, 11 (1918). The "special letter of credit," on the other hand, was addressed
to a specific person who alone could draw on it. Id.
75. 570 F.2d 202, 205 (7th Cir. 1978).
76. See note 80 infra.
77. 570 F.2d 202, 206 (7th Cir. 1978).
78. Id., n.7.
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letter did not fall within section 5-102(1)(c).7 9 However, the court
construed the requirement of presentation of the promissory note
as satisfaction of the need for a "documentary demand" under section 5-102(1)(a). The promissory note was the document, and its
presentation the demand. The court, therefore, found the letter to
be a letter of credit within the scope of Article 5, and not an ultra
vires guaranty.8 0
Judge Bauer wrote a strong dissent. He did not agree that the
presentation of the promissory note constituted a documentary demand. Although he conceded that the promissory note was a document, he questioned how presentation of the note, which was a
condition for honor of the demand, could also serve as a "demand
for payment."8 1
There is merit to this argument. The confusion arises because
section 5-103(1)(b) provides that a documentary demand for pay-

79. Technically, § 5-102(1)(c) should be the last resort, since it will apply only if § 5102(1)(a) or (b) does not.
80. The Seventh Circuit suggested that guaranties were no longer ultra vires for Illinois
chartered banks because of a recent change in Illinois law.
Defendant Rock Island Bank relied on three cases which held an Illinois bank's repurchase of bonds to be ultra vires. People ex rel. Barrett v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 364
Ill. 294, 4 N.E.2d 385 (1936); Hoffman v. Sears Community State Bank, 356 Ill. 598, 191
N.E. 280 (1934); Knauss v. Madison and Kedzie State Bank, 354 Ill.
554, 188 N.E. 836
(1934). Although based in part on Section 4 of the 1879 banking act, which has since been
repealed, these decisions expressed a policy of protecting bank depositors and shareholders
from such risky practices. Since these cases had not been specifically overruled, Rock Island
argued, the policy against guaranties survived the repeal of the statute.
The court, sitting in diversity, disagreed with this view of Illinois law. Section 4 had prohibited Illinois banks from guaranteeing payment of their customers' notes. However, this
section was repealed in January, 1962. The Illinois -Banking Act was amended in 1965 to
permit state banks to issue letters of credit which authorized holders to draw drafts upon
the issuing bank. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 1/2,
§ 105(13)(1979). Although the Illinois Banking
Act does not define letters of credit, the court applied the Uniform Commercial Code definition of letter of credit in construing § 105(13), because Illinois had adopted the U.C.C. four
years prior to the Banking Act Amendment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 5 (1979). Because the
express prohibition against guaranties had been repealed, "no constitutional or statutory
provision exists declarative of a public policy against the issuance of guaranties by Illinois
banks." 570 F.2d at 206.
The court's reasoning runs counter to the general rule that banks have only those powers
expressly granted them by statute. See generally Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the
Stand by Letter of Credit Controversy, 96 BANKING L.J. 46 (1979).
Judge Bauer, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the language of the Illinois Banking
Act authorizing letters of credit restricted the type of credit Illinois banks could issue to
those which authorized holders "to draw drafts." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16 1/2,
§ 105(13) (1979).
Since the Illinois Banking Act was enacted after the Illinois commercial code, the dissent
reasoned, the language of the Act prohibited credits such as the one issued by Rock Island,
which required no draft.
81. 570 F.2d at 209 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
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ment is a demand whose honor is conditioned on presentation of
documents. Since presentation of documents is a condition precedent to honor of the demand, presentation cannot be equated with
demand. 2
The facts in New Jersey Bank v.Palladino" were very similar
to those in Rock Island. Like the letter in Rock Island, the instrument issued by the First State Bank of Hudson County was intended to secure a loan made by plaintiff New Jersey Bank to defendant Palladino, a customer of both banks. The letter, which did
not mention the words "letter of credit," stated that it would
''serve as a commitment to [New Jersey Bank] that [First State
Bank] will assume the obligations arising from a note signed by
[Palladino]..

84

It conditioned honor of the commitment 90

days after date of the note upon notice that Palladino had defaulted on the loan.
Palladino defaulted on the note."8 It was unclear whether New
Jersey Bank had demanded payment from the issuer before it
82. Article 5 provides no definition for "presentation." It does define "presenter" as a
"person presenting a draft or demand for payment for honor under a credit .. " U.C.C. §
5-112(3) (1978 version). Section 5-112(1) concerns a "bank to which a documentary draft or
demand for payment is presented .. " U.C.C. § 5-112(1) (1978 version). The language of §
5-112 suggests that the demand for payment is separate from the presentation, since it is
something which is presented.
. "Presentment" is defined elsewhere in the Code as: "a demand for... payment made
upon the maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by or on behalf of a holder." U.C.C. § 3504(1) (1978 version). Article 3 prescribes the laws concerning negotiable instruments, however, and presentment, although deemed to be a demand for payment, could be construed as
a word of art applicable only to the demands for payment of negotiable instruments. Interestingly enough, the document presented for payment to the Rock Island Bank was a negotiable instrument. The court did not discuss the application of § 3-504, possibly because the
bank issuer was not a maker, acceptor or drawee. If, however, a bank issuer can be considered a payor, and if the definition of "presentment" in Article 3 can be applied to "presentation" in Article 5, presentation of any document required under a letter of credit could be
deemed a demand for payment as well.
The real issue centers around whether a documentary demand for payment must be made
by presentation of an expresss demand. If the primary attribute of the stand-by letter of
credit is its documentary format and a document which meets the Code definition is required for payment, presentation of only that document without an express demand for
payment both satisfies the requirement of the particular credit and retains the documentary
character of the letter of credit.
83. 77 N.J. 33, 389 A.2d 454 (1978).
84. Id. at 36, 389 A.2d at 456.
85. In fact, Palladino defaulted twice. When he defaulted on his first 90-day note, First
Bank sought to avoid paying under its letter of credit by persuading the beneficiary, New
Jersey Bank, to accept a reduction on Palladino's loan and renew the note. New Jersey
Bank agreed and First Bank issued a second, identical letter covering the renewal. Nevertheless, Palladino defaulted again. Id.

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 11

failed and was taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. After the failure, New Jersey Bank sued both First Bank
and Palladino for repayment of the loan. The trial court found the
letter to be a guaranty."
Relying on the scope and definition sections of Article 5, the
New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and ruled the letter to be a
bona fide stand-by letter of credit."' The court explained that
these sections describe a letter of credit as a bank's agreement to
honor written demands for payment upon compliance with specified conditions." It determined that the instrument met the section 5-102(1)(a) test by requiring a documentary demand for payment.89 Emphasizing the definition of document as "any paper,"
including a notice of default, 0 the court held the notice requirement to be a "documentary demand." Although the letter on its
face did not specify "written" notice, the court determined that
since the parties were sophisticated businessmen and bankers, they
knew a default must be in writing, and most probably intended
that the notice be written.' 1 Because it met the form test of section
5-102(1), the letter was a letter of credit and not an illegal
guaranty."2
However, unlike the court in Rock Island, the Palladino court
did not expressly equate the presentation of the notice with the
86. However, because Palladino had used part of the loan proceeds to reduce his loans
with First Bank, the trial court held that First Bank was estopped from raising the ultra
vires defense. Judgment was entered against First Bank for the entire obligation. The appellate court held the letter to be a guaranty, illegal under New Jersey law, not a letter of
credit within the scope of Article 5. The judgment for the entire obligation was vacated and
replaced by a judgment for the amount First Bank had received in reduction of Palladino's
personal loans. 146 N.J. Super. 6, 368 A.2d 943 (1976).
87. 77 N.J. 33, 389 A.2d 454, 462 (1978).
88. Id. at 40, 389 A.2d at 458.
89. Id. at 42, 389 A.2d at 461.
90. Id. at 40, 389 A.2d at 458.
91. The dissent argued emphatically that the letter required no document, because it did
not expressly require written notice. The court's "attempt to bootstrap the validity of the
document by resorting to the maxim that the law will imply an intent by the parties that
the writing be construed in a manner such as to lend validity to it," subverted the essence of
the letter of credit as an obligation to pay against specified documents. 77 N.J. 33, 51, 389
A.2d 454, 464 (1978) (Conford, J., dissenting).
92. As further support of the validity of the stand-by letter of credit before it, the court
cited cases upholding such instruments: Fidelity Bank v. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co., 465
F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1972); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. United States, 467 F.2d 1334 (Ct. Cl.
1972); Brummer v. Bankers Trust, 268 S.C. 21, 231 S.E.2d 298 (1977); Dovenmuehle, Inc. v.
East Bank, 563 P.2d 24 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Fair Pavilions, Inc. v. First Nat'l City Bank,
19 N.Y.2d 512, 227 N.E.2d 839, 281 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1967).
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demand requirement. It is possible that the Palladino court considered the concept of "demand" to be implicit in the "notice" requirement, so that a written notice of default supplied both the
document and the demand. By contrast, the Rock Island promissory note, of itself, did not constitute "notice" or a "demand."
93. Other courts have had occasion to construe the requirement of a "documentary demand for payment" under § 5-102(1)(a) in the context of the stand-by letter of credit, although not on the guaranty question. The decisions offer no hope'of a consensus. In contrast
to Rock Island and Palladino, where the paper was found to serve as both the document
and the demand, the paper in some cases was found to be a demand, but not a document.
In Brummer v. Bankers Trust, 268 S.C. 21, 231 S.E.2d 298 (1977), the instrument stated
that it was a letter of credit and required only a signed statement from the beneficiary that
it has incurred a liability due to the customer's failure to take a construction loan committed to the customer by the beneficiary. The court held that the instrument was a letter of
credit under §§ 5-102(1)(c) and 5-103(1)(a). The court apparently did not believe the statement alone met the documentary demand requirement of § 5-102(1)(a), since § 5-102(1)(c)
applies only when the instrument does not fall within § 5-102(1)(a) or (b). See note 67
supra. However, the court also found that the beneficiary in fact had complied with the
terms of the letter by demanding payment, and that the issuer incurred a legal obligation to
honor the demand. Since the only condition for payment was the submission of the statement of default, the court evidently found that the statement was a demand for payment.
The court in Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311 (Me. 1978) also relied
upon § 5-102(1)(c) to bring the instrument in question under the Article 5 umbrella. The
letter stated that it was a letter of credit and required written notice accompanied by the
original letter of credit. The letter did not describe what information the notice should contain. The court explained in a footnote that the letter did not require a documentary demand for payment since the written notice was not a document within the meaning of § 5103(1)(b). "Traditionally, a document, 'like' that described in § 5-103(1)(b), consists of a
paper having evidentiary value of some fact." Id. at 318 n.9. The written notice in this
instance lacked any such evidentiary purpose. The court's reasoning in Housing Securities
does not help to explain the holding in Brummer, where the statement provided documentary evidence of the existence of the customer's default.
Housing Securities may contain the seeds of a future construction of "documentary draft
or documentary demand" which would flesh out the "any paper" definition to mean "any
paper with evidentiary value." A strict reading of the Code militates against such a construction. Comment 1 to § 5-102(1)(a) emphasizes that "paragraph (1)(a) ... states that
whenever the promise to honor is conditioned on presentation of any piece of paper, the
transaction is within this Article..
" Such a construction would also create the further
problem of defining "evidentiary value."
This construction might, however, serve to characterize the use of the document as a "demand" in cases like Rock Island and Palladino,since the substance or evidentiary value of
the statement could be construed as effecting a demand, See First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Alcorn, 361 So.2d 481 (Miss. 1978), where the court upheld an instrument as a letter of credit
under § 5-102(1)(a) which did not state that it was a letter of credit, but required for payment presentation of an invoice approved by the customer. Although the letter did not request presentation of a draft accompanying the invoice, the court held that the instrument
lay within the definition of documentary drafts under § 5-103(1)(b). The court in effect
upheld the presentation of the approved invoice, which of course had "evidentiary value," as
a demand for payment. But see Dubuque Packing Co., Inc. v. Fitzgibbon, 599 P.2d 440
(Okla. Ct. App. 1979), where the court refused to uphold as a letter of credit a bank's instrument which required for payment presentation of an unpaid invoice, a copy of correspond-
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Both Rock Island and Palladino found the U.C.C. analysis useful in resolving the stand-by letter of credit identity crisis. They
focused on the documentary format as provided by sections 5103(1)(a) and (b) and 5-102(1)(a) as the basis for distinguishing
the stand-by letter of credit from the guaranty.
Application of Section 5-102(1)(c)
When the stand-by instrument is entitled "Letter of Credit" or
states that it is one, the courts have less difficulty in distinguishing
it from a guaranty. Even if the credit requires a documentary draft
or demand for payment, section 5-102(1)(c) is often relied upon to
support its validity.
One of the earliest cases to apply section 5-102(1)(c) in a guaranty challenge to a stand-by letter of credit was Barclays Bank v.
Mercantile National Bank.9" Barclays granted its customer, a real
estate developer, an interim construction loan. To induce Barclays
to make the loan, the developer's mortgage broker issued a letter
to Barclays promising to pay the loan if the developer defaulted.
The letter required for payment a sight draft drawn on the issuer,
ninety days' notice of intent to present the draft, and a signed
statement from Barclays stating that the loan had matured, was
past due, and remained unpaid.
After the borrower defaulted on the loan, Barclays presented its
draft and the documents to both the issuer and Mercantile, the
confirming bank. 95 At trial, Barclays recovered against Mercantile.
ing bill of lading and a letter certifying validity of the invoice. The court held that this
instrument, which called itself a letter of guaranty four times in the body of the letter,
created a secondary obligation to pay invoices once the customer had failed to pay. The
court did not note that every stand-by letter of credit performs such a function. Rather, the
court refused to fit this instrument within the scope and definition of Article 5 as an engagement to honor drafts or demands for payment. Implicit in the decision is the conclusion
that the requirement of presentation of specified documents was not a documentary
demand.
94. 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
95. A confirming bank is a bank that engages to honor a credit issued by another bank.
U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(f) (1978 version). This is a common practice among banks. Often, a buyer
will not have a banking relationship with a major, money-center bank, but instead will bank
locally. A seller may not be willing to rely on the unknown local bank's letter of credit
without further assurances. The local bank will often have a correspondent relationship with
a larger, better-known bank which will agree to "confirm" the local bank's letter of credit.
The confirming bank "becomes directly obligated on the credit to the extent of its confirmation as though it were its issuer and acquires the rights of an issuer." U.C.C. § 5-107(2)
(1978 version). The seller now has two direct promises to pay under the letter of credit and
may seek payment from either party. See Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425
F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1970); Dulien Steel Products, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 298 F.2d 836 (2d

1980]

Stand-by Letter of Credit

On appeal, Mercantile argued that the letter was a guaranty.
The Fifth Circuit first determined that the instrument fell
within the scope of Article 5. Although the letter required a documentary draft in the form of a sight draft and a signed. statement,
it did not meet the section 5-102(1)(a) test because it was not issued by a bank. Section 5-102(1)(b) did not apply because the
credit did not require documents of title. The letter was not even
entitled letter of credit; however, there was a reference within the
body of the instrument to "this letter of credit." The court found
that these words revealed the parties' intent to treat the instrument as a letter of credit.9 6 The court also determined that the
instrument met the section 5-103(1)(a) definition of letter of
credit. Although the decision did not expressly rely on the section
5-102 form test to defeat the guaranty challenge, its analysis necessarily incorporated section 5-102(1)(c) to bring the letter within
the scope of Article 5 from the outset.9"
Cir. 1962); Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, 199 Misc. 11, 97 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct.
1950); Kingdom of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct.
1949).
By contrast, an "advising bank" only advises the beneficiary that a credit has been issued
in its favor by another bank. Advising banks are used in international sales transactions
where the issuing bank is located far from the beneficiary. An adivising bank assumes no
obligation to make payments to the beneficiary under the credit. U.C.C. § 5-107(1) (1978
version). See Bril v. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank, 199 Misc. 11, 97 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct.
1950).
Mercantile sought to avoid its obligation as a confirming bank by advocating a strict reading of § 5-103(1)(f). Since the issuer of the letter was not a bank, but a mortgage broker,
Mercantile argued that it could not be a confirming bank: it had not engaged to honor a
credit issued by another bank. The court refused to read the Code so narrowly, citing Comment 2 to § 5-102(3) and the Code's broad policy, which encourages courts to develop "new
concepts to meet novel and diverse uses of the letter of credit." 481 F.2d 1224, 1232 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
96. The court did not discuss whether or not the words "letter of credit" were conspicuous as required by § 5-102(1)(c). See note 61 supra. They were not in larger type, and it is
doubtful that they were of a different color within the body of a typed letter. However, they
constituted a separate paragraph and so were set off from the paragraphs above and below
them. Arguably, the words were conspicuous enough to fit the instrument within § 5102(1)(c).
See also Housing Sec., Inc. v. Maine Nat'l Bank, 391 A.2d 311 (Me. 1978), where the court
found that the words "letter of credit," in the sentence "We hereby open our irrevocable
Letter of Credit," were "conspicuous" within the meaning of § 1-201.
97. In addressing the guaranty issue the court focused on Mercantile's posture as a confirming bank. Section 5-107(2) provides that a confirming bank becomes "directly obligated
on the credit. . .as though it were the issuer." The court reasoned that since the issuer had
a primary obligation on the instrument, rather than a secondary obligation as under a guaranty, the instrument was not a guaranty. This analysis begs the question whether the issuer's obligation was in fact primary, since functionally it was secondary to the customer's
promise to repay the loan. That question had already been answered by the court's finding
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Section 5-102(I)(c) was applied in response to a bank issuer's
guaranty defense in Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Northwest National Bank of Fort Worth.9s Northwest Bank issued its
letter, entitled "Irrevocable Letter of Credit," to secure a customer's promissory note payable to Republic Bank, the beneficiary.
The letter required for payment a draft, the original promissory
note, copies of letters sent by registered mail to the customer and
others providing notice of default, and the registered receipts
thereof dated no less than twenty days prior to the date of the
draft. The trial and appellate courts held the letter to be an illegal
guaranty, since it functioned like one by guaranteeing the debt of
another. 9 The Texas Supreme Court reversed and held the instrument to be a valid stand-by letter of credit.10 0
The court began its analysis by placing the bank's instrument
within Article 5, emphasizing the references to a "bank issuer" in
sections 5-102(1)(a) and 5-103(1)(a).10 1 It determined that there
were only two conditions precedent to payment: presentation of a
draft and presentation of specific documents. The documentary
format of the instrument persuaded the court that, although it appeared to create a secondary obligation, the letter in fact gave rise
to a primary liability of the bank to the beneficiary. The court
then turned to section 5-102(1)(c) and Comment 2 to section 5-102
for additional support,1 0 2 apparently unwilling to base its decision
on the documentary format of the instrument alone. The court
cited Barclays as a case which similarly relied on that section and
Comment.10 3
Once it determined that the instrument met the scope and definitional requirements of sections 5-102(1)(a) and 5-103(1)(a), the
court should not have felt compelled to seek statutory authority
for the stand-by letter of credit in section 5-102(1)(c). The Code
itself provides that this section is to be applied only when the requirements of section 5-102(1)(a) or (b) are not met. Since section
5-102(1)(a) applied, dependence upon section 5-102(1)(c) was
unnecessary.

that the instrument came within §§ 5-102(1)(c) and 5-103(1)(a). Clearly, reliance on § 5107(2), without more, could not have defeated the guaranty challenge.
98. 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978).
99. 566 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
100. 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978).
101. Id. at 112-13.
102. Id. at 116. See note 61 and 65 supra.
103. Id. at 113.
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The court's reliance on the Barclays' decision was equally inappropriate. The court in Barclays relied on section 5-102(1)(c) not
because the instrument in question was a stand-by letter of credit,
but because the letter was issued by a non-bank person and did
not require a document of title. Since the letter did not meet the
requirements of section 5-102(1)(a) or (b), the Barclays court
properly predicated its holding on section 5-102(1)(c).
In United Bank of Denver National Association v. Quadrangle,
Ltd.,10 4 the court made short shrift of a bank's guaranty defense.
The instrument in suit had been issued to secure a bond in a local
court and required for payment a draft, a statement that the beneficiary submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court, and a letter
endorsed by the beneficiary. It thus met the requirements of section 5-102(1)(a). 0 5 In addition, the instrument was conspicuously
entitled a letter of credit. The court held the letter to be a primary
obligation dependent solely on presentation of conforming documents, citing section 5-102(1)(c) as additional support. 10 6

104. 596 P.2d 408 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).
105. Id. at 409.
106. Id. See also East Bank of Colorado Springs v. Dovenmuehle, Inc., 196 Colo. 422,
589 P.2d 1361 (1978) and Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 419 F. Supp. 734 (D.
Minn. 1976). In East Bank, the bank issuer did not expressly characterize its letter as a
guaranty, but argued that the instrument was not a traditional letter of credit and therefore
was not subject to Article 5. The court found that the bank's letter required a documentary
demand pursuant to § 5-102(1)(a) (although, in fact, the letter required a draft and other
specified documents), that the instrument conspicuously stated it was a letter of credit pursuant to § 5-102(1)(c) and that it fell squarely within the § 5-103(1)(a) definition.
It is unclear in Prudential whether or not the court relied totally on § 5-102(1)(c) to
uphold the instrument before it as a valid stand-by letter of credit in the face of a guaranty
challenge. The letter was issued by Marquette National Bank to cover a $62,000 commitment fee under a loan agreement between Prudential and its customer. Marquette agreed to
pay Prudential the $62,000 if the customer failed to meet the conditions set out in the
agreement and close the loan.
Marquette's engagement was predicated on a draft and a letter of default. When the loan
failed to close, Prudential made demand on Marquette, submitting a draft and the appropriate letter. Marquette dishonored the draft and at trial raised the guaranty defense. The
court began its analysis by quoting two misleading definitions. To establish that the letter
was not a guaranty, the court cited the general guaranty definition: "A guaranty is a promise
to answer for the payment of some debt. . .in case of the default of another person." 419 F.
Supp. at 735. Frequently, a stand-by letter of credit performs exactly that function. The
court further confused the issue by defining a letter of credit as conferring "authority upon
the person to whom it is addressed to advance money or furnish goods..." Id. at 735.
Marquette's letter conferred no authority to advance money or furnish goods. Rather, it
promised to pay its customer's commitment fee if the customer failed to take the loan.
The court was ultimately persuaded that the instrument, which was labeled Irrevocable
Credit, was a letter of credit within §§ 5-102 and 5-103. From the decision, it is unclear
whether the court relied totally or only partially on § 5-102(1)(c).
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In each of the cases discussed above, the courts relied upon the
form tests in sections 5-102 and 5-103 to identify the instrument as
a stand-by letter of credit and effectively thwart the guaranty challenge. Once the instrument in issue falls within the scope and definitions of Article 5, it is a letter of credit and can avoid the pitfalls
of the ultra vires guaranty.
The Limitations of Analysis Under Section 5-102(1)(c)
The courts appear to agree that even a letter that requires no
documentary draft or documentary demand may be considered a
letter of credit if it states that it is one, as provided in section 5102(1)(c). 07 Taken to its extreme, however, this rationale can lead
to incongruous results. In Wichita Eagle and Beacon Publishing
Co. v.Pacific National Bank of San Francisco,05 the letter issued
by Pacific National Bank was entitled "letter of credit," and required for payment presentation of a sight draft, but no documents. It advised the beneficiary that the draft would be honored
"providing that all of the [stated] conditions exist at the time said
draft is received.

. ."109

by issuer. The conditions, relating to the

failure of the customer to complete a construction contract, were
listed in the letter. Upon default, the beneficiary presented the
sight draft and documents evidencing the existence of the conditions, and Pacific refused to pay. The trial court rejected Pacific's
guaranty defense and upheld the instrument as a valid stand-by
letter of credit." 0
In a terse opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held the letter
to be a guaranty."' The court found that the obligation was predi107. Accord, Baker v. National Boulevard Bank, 399 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
108. 343 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd, 493 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1974).
109. 343 F. Supp. at 341-42.
110. Id. at 339. Pacific argued that the letter was neither a "clean" nor a documentary
credit, since one of the conditions did require documents, but others did not. The required
documents were notices of default which the beneficiary had to send to the customer and
others. However, the letter did not expressly require presentment of the notices to the bank
along with the sight draft.
The trial court found that Pacific's "parochial" view "exalt[ed] formalism over commercial reality and usage." Id. at 338. Although the U.C.C. had not yet been enacted in California at the time of the transaction, the court was persuaded by § 5-102(3) and Comment 2
that the Cede "clearly countenanced" this kind of credit. Id. at 339 n.4.
111. 493 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1974). To the bank's chagrin, the court of appeals upheld
the guaranty challenge, and then proceeded to uphold the guaranty and to increase the
award of damages by $87,000. The court did not explain this action. See discussion in Murray, Letters of Credit in Non-Sale of Goods Transactions, 30 Bus. LAW. 1103, 1113-14
(1975).
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cated not merely on the presentation of a draft or documents, but
on the actual existence of most of the conditions listed in the letter. Therefore, it strayed "too far from the basic purpose of letters
of credit." ' Although the court did not mention the U.C.C., the
court, in effect, rejected a liberal construction of Section 5102(1)(c)." 5 If the instrument requires the bank to determine the
actual existence of stated conditions, it should be construed as an
ordinary guaranty.
Courts and commentators have cited Wichita Eagle with approval, believing it to underscore the conceptual difference between the stand-by letter of credit and the guaranty." 4 However,
there is latitude within the Code to construe instruments such as
the one issued by Pacific as letters of credit, if the parties intend to
enter into such an agreement. Section 5-1091" codifies the rule
that the issuer of a letter of credit has a single, primary obligation
to its customer: to examine documents and pay accordingly. An
issuer has no liability for the performance of the underlying contract between the customer and the beneficiary "unless otherwise
agreed."'11 Since the Code thus allows banks to enlarge on their
responsibility, a letter which embraces such an agreement but still
satifies the language of section 5-102(1)(c) arguably falls within the
scope of Article 5. By this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit could have
found the instrument in Wichita Eagle to be a valid letter of credit
even though it did not limit the bank's responsibility to that of
examining documents.
This analysis underlies the decision in CNA Mortgage Investors,

112. 493 F.2d at 1286.
113. The trial court also rejected reliance on § 5-102(1)(c) to support the issuance of a
non-documentary credit, but only because it misread that section. Comment 1, the court
explained, authorized banks and other persons "to bring documents other than documents
of title within the coverage of Section 5-102." Wichita Eagle and Beacon Publishing Co. v.
Pacific Nat'l Bank, 343 F. Supp. 332, 339 (N.D. Cal. 1971). In fact, the Comment also sanctions the issuance of "clean" letters of credit by banks. See note 62 supra.
114. See, e.g., Barclays Bank v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 481 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974); Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Nat'l Bank, 578
S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1978); Murray, Letters of Credit in Non-Sale of Goods Transactions, 30
Bus. LAW. 1103 (1975); Note, Guaranty Letters of Credit: Problems and Possibilities, 16
AM. L. REv. 822, 835 (1974).
115. U.C.C. § 5-109 states, in part: (1) An issuer's obligation to its customer. . .unless
otherwise agreed, does not include liability or responsibility (a) for performance of the underlying contract for sale or other transaction between the customer and the beneficiary. . . . (2) An issuer must examine documents with care. ...
116. U.C.C. § 5-109(1) (1978 version) (emphasis added).
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Ltd. v. Hamilton National Bank,' 7 where the letter stated that
the beneficiary's sight draft would be paid "in accordance with the
terms of the [underlying] Loan Application attached hereto and
becoming a part of this letter of credit.""' 8 The bank dishonored
the beneficiary's draft, contending that the beneficiary had not satisfied the prerequisite conditions. On the issue of whether a letter
of credit may incorporate the underlying transaction, the court
held that Article 5 specifically permits the parties to vary their obligations by agreement under a letter of credit." 9 If the letter can
be construed to permit an investigation into the underlying transaction, then the courts must abide by the intent of the parties.'2
Because the loan application in question contained no provision
relating to the payment of letters of credit, the court found no requirement that any document other than the sight draft need be
presented and held the bank liable on the draft. The court did not
explain how an instrument which required only a sight draft and
no further documents could' come within the scope of Article 5.
Although the court did not expressly rely on the words "letter of
credit" found within the body of the letter, the instrument probably qualifies as a section 5-102(1)(c) "clean" credit. If the court
had determined that the issuer had in fact been obligated to investigate the underlying transaction, it would nevertheless have held
the instrument to be a letter of credit. Such a letter would be indistinguishable from the one held to be a guaranty in Wichita
Eagle.
Thus, the logic of the form test, taken to its extreme, suggests
that a guaranty is not a guaranty when it is called a letter of credit.
The court in Wichita Eagle correctly discerned that treating an
instrument like the guaranty in that case as a letter of credit would
117.
118.
119.

540 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975, cert. denied 1976).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241-42, citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 616 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS]. See Kingdom
of Sweden v. New York Trust Co., 197 Misc. 431, 96 N.Y.S.2d 779, 787-90 (Sup. Ct. 1949);

Consolidated Sales Co. v. Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va. 307, 317, 68 S.E.2d 652, 658
(1952); E. E. Huber & Co. v. Lalley Light Corp., 242 Mich. 171, 174, 175, 218 N.W. 793, 794
(1928). The cases set out the rule later codified in § 5-109. Each held that the letter of credit
is separate from the underlying transaction, unless the terms of the parties' agreement are
specifically incorporated into the letter of credit.
120. CNA Mortgage Investors, Ltd. v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 54 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1975, cert. denied 1976). However, the court emphasized that "[iun view of the

documentary nature of letters of credit, very clear langage would be necessary to require
that something more than the presentation of specified documents is needed for payment."
Id. at 243.
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eliminate any distinction between the two.
An analysis of section 5-114(1) by Professors White and Summers suggests where the line should be drawn. They observe that
although no fewer than fifteen subsections of Article 5 contain the
phrase "unless otherwise agreed," the reigning principle of freedom
of contract is not absolute. There may be some terms the parties
might insert into a letter of credit that would be invalid. White
and Summers cite 5-114(1) as "non-variable": 12 ' An issuer must
honor a draft or demand for payment which complies with the
terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract between the customer and the beneficiary.1 2 Although a
"clean" stand-by letter of credit requires neither goods nor documents, section 5-114(1) embodies the raison d'etre for all-letters of
credit: non-involvement by the issuer in the actual facts of the underlying transaction. The subsection applies to stand-by letters of
credit whether or not they require specific documents other than a
draft for payment.
If this rule is "non-variable," then the parties cannot agree to
modify its application and still be said to have entered into a letter
of credit agreement. Thus, where section 5-102(1)(c), section 5-109,
and section 5-114(1) conflict, the non-variability of section 5-114(1)
should prevail.
CONCLUSION

Section 5-102 of the U.C.C. has been effectively employed to distinguish the valid stand-by letter of credit from the ultra vires
guaranty. However, the courts have struggled in their efforts to enforce a commercially useful financial instrument because of their
reluctance to uphold an apparently unlawful undertaking by a
bank. This tension has led to occasional misapplication of section
5-102 and erroneous justifications for the legality of the stand-by
letter.
A valid stand-by letter of credit requires no involvement by the
issuer in the actual facts of the underlying transaction. The tests in
section 5-102 express this rule and assist the courts iii upholding
the various forms of an instrument that the commercial world has
widely adopted. As the courts become more comfortable with the
stand-by letter of credit, they will rely less on section 5-102(1)(c)
121.
122.

WHrrm & SuMMmss, supra note 119.
U.C.C. § 5-114(1).
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and will apply section 5-102(1)(a) more frequently. Emphasis on
the form test of section 5-102(1)(a) will encourage the courts to
develop workable definitions for "document" and "documentary
demand for payment." Once clearly defined and therefore easily
recognizable, the stand-by letter of credit would shake off the guaranty stigma and take on the respectability of the traditional merchandise letter of credit.
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